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Outlines of Pyrrhonism (in short “PH”) - a treatise in three books written by a sceptic, Sextus 
Empiricus (II/III century AD), can certainly be recognized as a masterpiece of philosophy. Its 
importance is rather due not to its direct influence on the philosophy of Sextus’ times2, but 
because of its impact on two ground-breaking periods: firstly, the Renaissance as a historical 
epoch when Sextus’ works were discovered, translated and widely read by humanists. And 
secondly, due to Sextus’ influence on the “revival” of scepticism in the second half of the 20th 
century.3  
There are very few traces of the influence of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism on other works 
before the Renaissance.4 The situation changed significantly when Henricus Stephanus (Henri 
Estienne), a great humanist, translator and editor of i.a. Plato’s works, published a Latin 
translation of Outlines of Pyrrhonism in 1562.5 In 1569 Gentian Hervet published his 
translations of Adversus dogmaticos (in short “AD”) and Adversus mathematicos (“AM”)6, whereas 
                                                                        
1 The work on the project was financed by the National Science Centre and was approved by a decision no. DEC-
2013/09/B/HS1/01996.  
2 Cf. Sextus Empiricus, PH, Outlines of Scepticism, eds. J. Annas, J. Barnes, “Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Philosophy”, Cambridge 20077, p. xi 
3 Cf. J. Barnes, Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causation. Observation on the Scepticism of Sextus Empiricus, „Aufstieg und Niedergang 
der Römischen Welt”, II, 36, 4, (eds. W. Haase, H. Temporini) Berlin–New York 1990, p. 2608–2695: “scepticism is 
again in fashion” (p. 2608). On the importance of scepticism and overview of its stages in Polish cf. R. Ziemińska, 
Historia sceptycyzmu. W poszukiwaniu spójności, Toruń 2013. 
4 Nevertheless, the influence of Pyrrhonism can be noticed in works of Plotinus, Gregory of Nazianzus, Julian the 
Apostate and neoplatonic commentators in the 5th and 6th century AD (cf. D. Machuca, Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, 
Works and Legacy, “Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie” 55(1/2), 2008, p. 58). 
5 Sexti philosophi Pyrrhoniarum hypotypōseōn libri III: quibus in tres philosophiae partes seuerissimè inquiritur; libri 
magno ingenii acumine scripti, uariáque doctrina referti; graecè nunquam, latinè nunc primùm editi / interprete 
Henrico Stephano. Anno M. D. LXII ([Parisiis]: Excudebat idem Henricus Stephanus, illustris viri Huldrici Fuggeri 
typographus.  
6 Sexti Empirici viri longe doctissimi Aduersus mathematicos: hoc est, aduersus eos qui prositentur disciplinas, opus 
eruditissimum, complectens vniuersam Pyrrhoniorum acutissimorum philosophorum disputandi de quibuslibet 
disciplinis & artibus rationem, Graecè nunquam Latinè nunc primùm editum, Gentiano Herueto Aurelio interprete; 
eiusdem Sexti Pyrrhoniarum hypotysoseon libri tres: quibus in tres philosophiae partes seuerissimè inquiritur. Libri 
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in 1621 a Greek edition of Sextus’ works was released with their Latin translation.7 
Afterwards, Sextus’ texts had a profound influence on the development of modern philosophy8 
and, to quote Diego Machuca, they are “the key to understanding the origin and development 
of early modern philosophy”.9 Thanks to these works, philosophical discussions that took place 
in the 17th century shifted their focus from metaphysics to epistemology.10 Even though the 
scope and strength of influence of the Sextus’ writings are still under debate, the presence of 
sceptic reminiscences in the works of such philosophers as Michel de Montaigne, René 
Descartes, Blaise Pascal, Pierre-Daniel Huet, François De La Mothe Le Vayer, David Hume 
is indisputable.11  
Undoubtedly, scepticism has been of particular interest among philosophers over the 
last few decades.12 The philosophical shift to epistemology and logical analysis has been a 
reason for intensification and widened scope of research on the works of Sextus Empiricus. 
Sextus started to be perceived not only as doxographer or the primary source of our 
knowledge on Pyrrhonism, but also as a representative of an important philosophical tradition 
that is interesting per se. Sextus’ works have been recognized for a large amount of 
argumentation and have been analysed from the perspective of their logical value, the 
correctness of argumentation and their persuasive power. The growing interest in Sextus has 
contributed to translations of his works into various languages.  
Despite the great interest in Sextus around the world, Polish literature did not have 
much to offer. In the previous century a Polish reader could find only two full Sextus’ 
translations: of Outlines of Pyrrhonism by Adam Krokiewicz13 and Against the Logicians by 
                                                                        
magno ingenij acumine scripti, veriaq́ue doctrina referti: Graece nunquam, Latinè nunc primùm editi, interpretate 
Henrico Stephano; accessit & Pyrrhonis vita, ex Diogene Laërtio, ex vulgata interpretatione, sed multis in locis 
castigata; item, Claudij Galeni Pergameni contra Academico & Pyrrhonios, D. Erasmo Roterodamo interprete, Parisiis: 
Apud Martinum Iuuenem, via S. Ioannis Lateranensis, ad insigne serpentis, M. D. LXIX. Cum privilegio Regis.  
7 SECTOU EMPEIRIKOU TA SWZOMENA. Sexti Empirici opera quae extant. Magno ingenii acumine scripti, 
Pyrrhoniarum Hypotyposeon libri III. Quibus in tres philosophiae partes acerrime inquiritur, Henrico Stephano 
interprete, Adversus Mathematicos, hoc est, eos qui disciplinas profitentur, libri X, Gentiano Herveto Aurelio 
interprete, Graece nunc primum editi. Adiungere visum est Pyrrhonis Eliensis Philosophi vitam: nec non Claudii Galeni 
Pergameni De optimo docendi genere librum, quo adversus Accademicos Pyrrhoniosque disputat. Ms. nostri varias 
lectiones et coniecturas aliquot margini insertas operi praefiximus. Indicibus item necesariis opus locupletavimus. 
Genevae. Typis ac sumptibus Petri et Jacobi Chouet, MDCXXI. 
8 R. Popkin, A History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, Berkeley 19722. On the rediscovery of Sextus in the 16th 
century cf. L. Floridi, Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism, Oxford 2002. 
9 D. Machuca, op. cit., p. 29.  
10 Cf. Annas/Barnes, p. xi.  
11 Cf. the discussion presented by Diego Machuca on Richard Popkin’s opinion (op. cit., p. 58–61).  
12 Machuca (op. cit.) dates back this growing interest to the 1980s. 
13 Sextusa Empirikusa „Zarysów Pirrońskich” księga pierwsza, druga i trzecia. Przetłumaczył i wstępem poprzedził Adam Krokiewicz, 
Kraków 1931.  
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Izydora Dąmbska.14 Then, this list was extended with the translation of Against the Professors15 
and of the remaining books of Against the Dogmatists, i.e. treatises Against the Physicists and 
Against the Ethicists.16 
The only Polish translation of Outlines of Pyrrhonism by Adam Krokiewicz came out in 
1931. It created great controversy at the time of publication, followed by a discussion between 
the translator and another recognized Polish scholar Walter Auerbach. The discussion was 
generated by Krokiewicz’s translation style and his unique philosophical and philological 
insight, which was an incentive for him to do etymological research and experiment with word 
formation.17  
The presented translation is not so much marked by an individual approach to the text 
as Krokiewicz’s, as it aims at maintaining clarity and accordance with terminological tradition. 
Sextus’ style does not prompt translators to experiment with language18. The style and the 
language of the Outlines is simple and adapted to its content. It is neither rhetorical nor 
complicated as regards syntax or vocabulary. Repeatability of schemas as well as an 
established scope of used terminology indicate that Sextus follows a certain tradition which 
developed its own linguistic, syntactic and argumentative convention. Extraordinary 
elements, such as wit, irony and literary quotes appear quite rarely. Sextus’ style is as 
impersonal and devoid of emotions as his self-presentation. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that translation of Sextus’ treatises is an easy task. The 
difficulty in translating Sextus’ works and philosophical texts from the late antiquity in 
general is caused by the rich and long-established philosophical tradition, a variety of sources 
from which they draw, and a multitude of texts they refer to. Hence, the philosophical 
terminology in Sextus’ works may seem sometimes confusing, ambiguous and inconsistent. 
Our understanding of Greek thought, based on textbook rules, as well as adopted 
terminological conventions formed in us a habit of associating provided terms with  
an established tradition and widely accepted terminology. However, unambiguity and 
terminological consistency are not so obvious in Sextus’ work. Its reader must remember that 
                                                                        
14 Sekstus Empiryk, Przeciw logikom, translation, introduction, notes and a glossary by I. Dąmbska, Warszawa 1970. 
15 Sekstus Empiryk, Przeciw uczonym, translation, introduction and commentary by Z. Nerczuk, Kęty 2007. 
16 Sekstus Empiryk, Przeciw fizykom. Przeciw etykom, translation, introduction and annotations by Z. Nerczuk, Kęty 2010. 
17 Cf. Walter Auerbach’s review of Krokiewicz’s translation: Sextusa Empirikusa „Zarysów Pirrońskich” księga pierwsza, 
druga i trzecia. Przetłumaczył i wstępem poprzedził Adam Krokiewicz. Kraków 1931. Nakładem Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności. 
Str. XV. 172, „Ruch Filozoficzny” 13(1–4), 1935, p. 6a–8a and a Krokiewicz’s reply: A. Krokiewicz, W sprawie polskiego 
przekładu Sextusa, „Przegląd Filozoficzny” 37, 1935, p. 240–248. 
18 Annas/Barnes, p. xiv–xv: “They are also well written. Sextus’ Greek is simple: his vocabulary is restrained, his syntax 
pellucid. Irony, and even sarcasm, are occasionally detectable; but the rhetorical trowel is not one of Sextus’ 
implements. Sentences are sometimes complicated (for Sextus sometimes has complicated arguments to express); but 
they are never convoluted, nor tortured. […] Sextus’ style is professional, and perfectly adapted to his matter”. 
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many references to other texts or philosophical ideas are already based on a certain 
interpretational tradition. A number of texts which are referred to in PH had already been 
translated into another philosophical language or paraphrased long before Sextus. A perfect 
example here can be Gorgias’ treatise On the Non-Existent (there are numerous references to 
this work in Sextus’ Outlines), the language of which and the method of argumentation was 
fully adapted to the sceptical standards. It is also visible in the references to Plato’s Theaetetus 
(on the basis of which Plato is interpreted as a sceptic), or the reports on the Pythagorean and 
Platonic doctrine of monad and the indefinite dyad. In all these cases there is no doubt that 
Sextus refers to the texts which he does not know in the original versions, and which at some 
point were completely transformed, adapted and reinterpreted. 
Sextus’ translator must always be aware of the duality of the terms used by Sextus: the 
terms of (usually) unknown original and the terms of paraphrase or interpretation presented 
in Sextus’ writings. Even if the used concepts may be immediately associated with a particular 
philosophical tradition, e.g. Platonic, Aristotelian etc., and consequently prompt to be 
translated in accordance with an established convention, it does not mean that Sextus uses 
them following such a tradition and that they are used in a consistent way in the whole text. 
That is why translation of such supposedly obvious terms as ou)si/a, u(po/stasiv, du/namiv, 
ei)=nai, sumbai/nein, e[n, mona/v etc. is often very challenging. 
This terminological inconsistency applies also to the Pyrrhonian tradition, as a result  
of complicated process in which the ancient Pyrrhonism developed. Although Sextus uses 
sceptical terms in a seemingly consistent way, it should be borne in mind that his scepticism  
is not a single system, but a blend of various influences rooted in numerous sceptical traditions. 
Therefore, in Translator’s view, there is no hope of finding a coherent  
and consistent idea of scepticism in Sextus’ work. Moreover, clinging to this hope is a perfect 
example of a)neidwlopoi//hsiv (“humbug”) typical for some historians of philosophy, who take 
for granted that Sextus’ logical and argumentative standards must suit their own 
requirements as regards coherence and rationality. To understand Sextus better there is no 
other way as researching on the transmission of the philosophical works which are referred to 
in Sextus’ writings and thus unveiling the terminological dependencies and transformations 
of the concepts.  
 Work on the translation of Outlines was a source of reflection about some controversial 
issues relating to the form and content of Sextus’ writings, i.a. the problem of relative 
chronology of Sextus’ treatises, the structure of Outlines and the view of the history of 
philosophy depicted in PH. 
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The chronological order in which Sextus wrote his works is widely discussed. The 
thesis that a treatise Against the Professors was created later than Against the Dogmatists (“AD”) 
is rather widely accepted (despite some hardly justified objections), which is supported by 
references to Against the Dogmatists that are present in the former of these works.19 
The problem of relative chronology of PH and the preserved part of AD (Against the 
Mathematicians, in short “AM”, VII-XI) is much more controversial. Despite rich comparative 
material in form of numerous parallel passages in both texts, researchers remain divided over 
this issue: the majority of them refrain from expressing any opinion, others, in line with 
orthodoxy, claim that PH was written earlier than AD20, whereas some put forward a thesis 
that AD is prior to PH.21 On the basis of Translator’s experiences while working on 
translation of AM IX–XI (AD) and PH, it may be argued that PH was created later, as some 
argumentations used in Outlines are so compressed that it is in some cases necessary to 
compare parallel reasoning included in AD so as to understand their content. Thus 
comparison of parallel passages may suggest that most of the argumentation in PH is a 
compiled and compressed version of argumentation included in AD.22  
Another observation concerns the structure of the Outlines. Sextus’ treatise in modern 
editions comprise three books, which are divided into chapters, and then into sections. 
Division into three books is definitely Sextus’ own idea, as he himself refers to it a few times23. 
The sections were introduced by Fabricius in his edition of Sextus’ treatises24 and became a 
standard way of giving references to Sextus’ works.  
 The origin of a division into chapters with their headings is a subject of controversy. 
J. Annas and J. Barnes claim that this division “is probably coming from Sextus himself”25. 
However, in Translator’s view, two counterarguments can be adduced against this thesis. 
Firstly, in PH we can find headings which are misleading and divide the text in a certainly 
incorrect manner26. Secondly, Sextus personally comments on the construction of the PH and 
                                                                        
19 Cf. D. Machuca, op. cit., p. 37; AM I 26, 29, 33, 35, 282; AM II 106; AM III 116; AM VI 52, 58, 61.  
20 Esp. Karel Janáček on the basis of stylistic and terminological comparisons (cf. Sextus Empiricus’ Sceptical Method, 
Prague 1975). 
21 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists, p. xxiv.  
22 Worth mentioning is also the argument advanced by Fernanda Decleva Caizzi (Sesto e gli scettici, in: “Elenchos” 13, 
1992, p. 279–327, 284, annotation 11), who points out that if Commentaries mentioned in PH I 222 are “Sceptical 
commentaries” which are equated with AD, then we must consequently presume that AD is prior to PH.  
23 Cf. PH I 241; PH II 258; PH III 279.  
24 Annas/Barnes, xxxiv: “The section division is modern, first appearing (I think) in the elegant edition published by 
A. Fabricius in 1718.”  
25 Annas/Barnes, xiv: “The discussion is divided into chapters, the division probably coming from Sextus himself.”, a 
także Annas/Barnes, xxxiv: “The book division certainly, and the chapter division probably derive from Sextus.” 
26 Cf. e.g. a wrong heading in PH III 188 (“What is an art of living”) or a heading in PH I 36 (“The Ten Modes”), 
which Annas/Barnes advise to put before PH I 35. 
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the structure of Book I. The whole treatise is divided into “a general account” (Book I) and “a 
specific account” (Books II and III)27. The general account, according to Sextus, covers the 
concept of scepticism28, its origin and principles29, arguments30, standard31, aim32, modes of 
suspension of judgement33, how sceptical assertions are understood34, and the distinction 
between scepticism and neighbouring philosophies.35 Nearly the same structure of Book I 
(with only one difference) is repeated by Sextus in PH I 209.36 This example derived from 
Book I shows that Sextus’ own idea of the division of the treatise differs from the one marked 
by chapters. The problem of “internal” composition of PH would require a separate study, but 
it should be underlined that a full reconstruction of Sextus plan would allow for revealing the 
original text structure, which, in Translator’s view, was lost due to the introduction of 
chapters that subdivide the text.  
The last issue addressed in this short note is the view of the history of philosophy 
presented in Sextus’ work. In Sextus’ writings we can find many valuable quotes, paraphrases, 
or references that broaden our knowledge of Greek philosophy. Yet, Sextus is not only a 
doxographer. His treatises, especially PH, picture a particular view of the history of Greek 
philosophy, and, interestingly, it is a view that significantly differs from this which we regard 
as a standard exposition of the history of philosophy. It is no use applying the view of the 
history of Greek philosophy established by Hegelian school in the 19th century with its 
division into subsequent development stages and breakthroughs connected with Socrates’, 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s thoughts. There is only a passing reference to Socrates in PH, whereas 
Plato’s thought is mentioned only with regard to the theory of things in fluxu. Aristotle’s 
philosophy is also of minor significance, as it is referred to only three times in the overview of 
physical theories. Instead, in PH we find extensive presentation of Stoic and Epicurean ideas, 
                                                                        
27 Cf. I 5-6. This dual structure can be found also in other Sextus’ works (cf. a notice in AM PR. 7–8; AM VII 1–2 [it 
can be inferred from Sextus’ words that the general part preceding the detailed exposition included in AM VII–XI was 
lost], AM IX 1–3).  
28 “The definition” is discussed in a passage PH I 7–11.  
29 Cf. PH I 12.  
30 Commenting on this part, Annas/Barnes notice that this list does not include any information on the issues present 
in the passage PH I 13–20. However, it seems to be a well-based assumption that lo/goi are here a reference to the 
sceptical manner of expression (“not-dogmatising”), which is discussed in a passage PH I 13–15.  
31 Cf. PH I 21–24.  
32 Cf. PH I 25–30.  
33 Cf. PH I 31–186.  
34 Cf. PH I 187–209.  
35 Cf. PH I 210–241.  
36 There are mentioned “parts” instead of “origin and principles”. It remains unclear which part of the text Sextus 
describes in this way, since we do not find any explanation of this term in Book I. A reference to this problem is made 
in PH II 12–13. It may be a result of the fact that PH’s text was redrafted and a mention of “branches of philosophy” 
might have been made primarily in Book I or it may be a reference to the structure of a lost part of Adversus dogmaticos 
(I–V), as PH’s Book I seems to be its redrafted version.  
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as well as the whole list of the figures which are also completely unknown to us or considered 
to be of lesser importance, such as Xeniades, Oenopides, Hippo of Rhegium, Onomacritus, 
Diodorus Cronus, Menodotus of Nicomedia and others. 
Sextus’ view of the sceptic tradition is also far from textbook standards. Pyrrho is 
presented rather as a legendary founder of Scepticism than a prominent figure and 
philosopher, Aenesidemus is an exponent of unorthodox sceptical stance. Paradoxically this is 
a philosophy of Arcesilaus which is shown close to the sceptical tradition (with some 
differences pointed out). Sextus’ report demonstrates how questionable is a textbook 
discussion of the sceptical tradition and how many generalizations are required to build any 
universal and coherent history of Scepticism.  
The above mentioned issues prove that the view of philosophy preserved in Sextus’ 
writings is an extremely interesting subject of research. The discrepancy between Sextus’ 
view and the standard of the history of Greek philosophy, applicable from the 19th century to 
date (which is a quite bizarre construction) should make us think about the prevailing schema 
and create some mistrust in clichés and “compelling” historical opinions and generalizations. 
The prerequisite for this is the rejection of belief in superiority of our absolutizing 
reconstruction and the rejection of conviction that Sextus’ view of the history of philosophy 
is a result of author’s ignorance or the character of his sources. Sextus certainly knows about 
the disputes that took place in antiquity more than we do on the grounds that he is their direct 
participant. Hence, Sextus’ treatises should be researched with a broad mind, with a firm 
conviction that they reveal a unique historical-philosophical perspective, which should not be 
adapted to our existing schemas, but rather should encourage us to ponder how much this 
perspective enriches and modifies our view on Greek philosophy. 
 
 
